In many countries infrastructure liberalization proceeded faster than the privatization of former state monopolies. Regulatory agencies, established to oversee the transition and safeguard the preconditions for competition, therefore monitor state-owned firms in addition to privately owned firms. Prior accounts of similar arrangements have generated contradictory claims. The paper studies two propositions of this literature theoretically and empirically for the European telecommunications sector. It examines, firstly, whether the dual role of the state as owner and regulator distorts competition. Secondly, it probes whether the combination of government ownership and regulation helps overcome some of the shortcomings of the regulation of private firms.
Introduction
Government regulation and public ownership were historically considered as alternative means of controlling market power in industries defying competitive market organization. In the U.S., a system of mixed ownership emerged in infrastructure industries such as energy and telecommunications. Privately owned public utilities served the majority of customers and were regulated by specialized federal and state agencies. Government owned entities, like the federal power projects or municipal enterprises, were essentially exempted from oversight by the regulatory agencies.
Outside of North America, state ownership was dominant. Government oversight was executed through parliament and ministries but no specialized regulatory agencies were established. This started to change during the 1990s, when in many countries liberalization progressed faster than privatization, forcing new market entrants to compete against wholly or partially state-owned incumbents. Where government oversight was deemed necessary, the newly created regulatory agencies were granted jurisdiction over privately and publicly owned firms alike.
This hitherto untested arrangement is now widespread in energy and telecommunications outside of North America. For example, in 2000, regulatory agencies oversaw telecommunications operators with significant public ownership stakes in nine of the fifteen member states of the European Union (EU). In some countries this arrangement was the outcome of deliberate policies to retain direct government control over telecommunications networks. In other nations it emerged as a by-product of stalled privatization, often due to unfavorable conditions in the capital markets. As the privatization process has stagnated in recent years, it is unlikely that regulated public firms will be a transitory phenomenon. The coincidence of state ownership and regulation has created apprehension and support. From a laissez faire ideological perspective, continued state ownership is seen as an anomaly (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998) . It is also pointed out that state regulation of public firms is reminiscent of the past, when state monopolies regulated their own markets. Replicating past experience, the dual role of the state as regulator and (part) owner would inevitably lead to regulatory bias against new entrants (Noll 2000) . Proponents of both views advocate accelerated privatization. In contrast, recent research in information economics and contract theory insinuates that the combination of government regulation and ownership could mitigate asymmetric information problems hampering the regulation of private firms. The validity of these claims has not yet been tested and is the subject of this paper.
Compared to the vast literature on ownership, competition, and regulation (e.g., Vickers and Yarrow 1988, Newbery 1999) , the published research on partially state-owned ("mixed") firms is slim (Eckel and Vining 1985 , Boardman and Vining 1989 , Boardman and Vining, 1991 . The behavior of public and mixed firms under regulation has not been studied systematically, although it raises interesting theoretical and practical issues. * The author wishes to thank Carol Ting for research assistance. Douglas N. Jones and Jeffrey H. Rohlfs provided helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
Two aspects are explored in this paper, using European telecommunications to probe the conceptual arguments. Firstly, the interaction between regulatory agencies and publicly owned enterprises is examined. Does full or partial state ownership bias regulation in favor of these firms? Conversely, do regulators, to avoid the appearance of improper oversight, adopt more stringent measures that potentially disadvantage public and mixed service providers? Or is regulation neutral with regard to ownership? Secondly, the role of continued public ownership in an era of increasing trust in competition and market forces is reviewed. Are regulated public and mixed enterprise used as instruments of government policy to achieve goals unattainable through private enterprise? If so, what are the performance consequences for individual firms and the sector? Or do public and mixed firms behave like private corporations?
The theme is developed as follows. A conceptual framework is presented in the next section. The third section discusses the role of ownership, competition, and regulation and their interaction in regulated public and mixed firms. The paper proceeds with a review of the changing role of the state in EU telecommunications. The fifth and sixth sections examine the practical experience, using descriptive statistics and econometric techniques, respectively. In addition to summarizing the main findings, the last section presents policy conclusions and questions for further research. In a nutshell, the paper finds hints but no systematic pattern of favorable or damaging regulatory treatment of public and mixed firms. Neither does it find compelling evidence that continued state ownership serves unique public interest goals beyond the reach of regulated private firms.
Whereas circumstances are identified in which public ownership could help overcome the limits of markets and regulation, it is unlikely that such policies will be adopted given the present low trust in the public sector. Thus, while there may be no strong reason for accelerated privatization from a competitive point of view, there is also little evidence that further privatization would jeopardize vital public policy goals.
A conceptual framework
Property rights interact with the competitive setup and the regulatory framework of a market as a system of incentives, affecting decision-making and performance at the firm and sector levels (Vickers and Yarrow 1988) . Their working in regulated public, mixed and private firms is depicted in figure 1.
1 In regulated private firms, competition and monitoring by private shareholders jointly affect the level of efficiency. Regulation intends to secure the preconditions for effective competition or serves as a substitute for it. Moreover, it attempts to steer private firms toward a desired level of social output (e.g., universality of service). In the case of regulated public and mixed firms, this twopronged incentive structure is muddled, as both regulation and public ownership may be utilized to enforce social output goals. Because the goals of owners and regulators typically diverge, this arrangement can create considerable strain.
[ Figure 1 about here]
1 In addition, the courts have an important role in resolving disputes and assuring that all actors follow legal and regulatory provisions. As well, antitrust enforcement affects firm conduct and industry performance. Although the role of the courts and antitrust is important, a detailed treatment would have exceeded the scope of this paper and was not pursued further. This approach seemed justified by the fact that EU stakeholders have access not only to the national courts but also the European Court of Justice, creating a fairly homogenous system of law enforcement and antitrust supervision throughout the EU.
A wide spectrum of options exists for designing the attributes of this institutional matrix: ownership can range from full public to full private, the market structure can range from monopoly to effective competition, and regulation can vary from command-and-control oversight to light-handed monitoring. From a normative point of view, the elements of the institutional matrix should be shaped to facilitate the optimization of welfare. More formally, the policy problem is to create conditions and adopt specific measures that optimize a social welfare function (W):
In this simple formulation, Π denotes private output and S social output, which is not forthcoming from unfettered markets. Essentially, government has to solve an optimization problem in which the weights attached to private and social output reflect the prevailing goals and political values.
With given resources, it is reasonable to assume that social output can only be increased at the expense of private output once society has reached its production possibility frontier. Under conditions of perfect information and zero transaction cost, institutional arrangements would not matter. Direct provision of services by the state (public ownership), public regulation of private activity, or tax-subsidy schemes would all be equivalent options to reach a desired state (Sappington and Stiglitz 1987) . Government would not only be able to realize efficient policies along the possibility frontier but could also implement any feasible desired combination of private output Π* and social output S*. For example, a government preferring private output would assign a high weight b (e.g., choose combination A in figure 2); a government preferring social output would assign a lower weight b (e.g., choose combination B in figure 2).
2
[ Figure 2 about here]
However, under conditions of imperfect information and self-interested behavior by agents, ownership and other institutional arrangements matter, as they create unique incentive systems with corresponding performance differences. Economists generally agree that the combination of competition and private ownership is an efficient arrangement in a broad set of circumstances, especially if markets perform their coordination functions well. However, in the presence of market failure or societal preferences that are unfulfilled by private markets, other mechanisms, including regulation or state ownership, might be appropriate (Hansmann 1995 , Willner 2001 , Kwoka 2002 , Nelson 2002 ).
To analyze the combination of public ownership and regulation, we employ a model of managerial behavior first proposed by Williamson (1964) and applied by Eckel and Vining (1985) to mixed firms. Their model assumes that managers in public and private firms have similar motivations and maximize utility. Utility is a function of their income (Y) and non-pecuniary variables such as security, power, status, prestige, and professional excellence. 3 For simplicity, these are all lumped in an expense preference variable (e), which could be envisaged as "staff" under the control of managers. It is further assumed that the market conditions are externally given. As production increases from zero, both profits and "staff" expenditures increase up to a maximum level beyond which "staff" can only be further increased at the expense of profits. The firm can only produce a higher level of social output at the expense of profit π or "staff" e. 4 These relations are illustrated in figure 3 , in which lower hills correspond to higher levels of social output.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Management's effort depends on the relevant incentive and monitoring mechanisms. Kwoka 1996 ) that managers of publicly owned firms are intrinsically motivated to pursue social output. This paper does not explore this possibility in more detail. The outcomes would be similar to a case in which social monitoring is highly effective. 4 Small letters refer to variable specified at the firm level.
expenses on the part of the principals. Public and private principals desire high efficiency levels, but public principals may additionally seek social output. For any given efficiency level, higher profits can only be achieved at the expense of social output.
Regulated public and mixed firms
The combination of regulation and (partial) public ownership could help overcome structural limits of regulation. For example, regulators can only provide investment incentives but cannot directly decide its level and structure. This lack of control can undermine public policies intended to foster infrastructure expansion and modernization.
Public ownership could provide an additional lever to overcome this governance problem. 5 Public ownership may also alleviate the asymmetry of information between the regulatory agency and the firm (Shapiro and Willig 1995) . 6 Mixed regulated firms could therefore be seen as an institutional arrangement in which private ownership safeguards efficiency, whereas regulation and partial public ownership assure social output. As regulated public and mixed firms combine incentive mechanisms in unusual and potentially contradictory ways, a brief review of the role of ownership, competition and regulation is useful before their interaction is explored further.
Early theories of public ownership simply assumed that government could utilize stateowned firms as instruments of public policy (Thiemeyer 1993 (Aharoni, 1986) . Strong unionization of state-owned enterprises' employees can further complicate decision-making. Firms operating under public ownership are also shielded from the pressures of the capital and the take-over markets (Vickers and Yarrow 1988) . By the same token, as access to the equity market is blocked, they have fewer financing options than private firms. Moreover, managers may be political appointees and therefore indifferent to the reputation effects of poor performance.
The recent literature has demonstrated that the incentive structure of private firms also has serious weaknesses (Nelson 1981 , Laffont and Tirole 1993 , Willner 2001 ).
Nevertheless, given the organizational setup of public firms, the utility of state-owned firms' managers will likely be more influenced by "staff" e than profit π (expressed in steeper indifference curves in figure 3 ). The recent survey by Megginson and Netter (2001) , who find that private firms are more efficient than publicly owned firms, corroborates this conjecture. Empirical observations show a great variance, however:
some state-owned firms exhibit extraordinary performance (e.g., Telia, the Swedish telecommunications operator, until recently fully state-owned) and many outperform private rivals (Willner 2001 , Kwoka 2002 . Moreover, where government officials work in a pragmatic environment, they may succeed in negotiating social objectives with a public firm's management without distorting its performance (Nowotny 1982 , Willner 2001 ).
In contrast to the diversity of findings on ownership, there is consensus that effective competition is a powerful efficiency incentive. Nonetheless, there is a wide range of theories on how competition achieves its beneficial effects (Vickers 1994) . Under conditions of stable technology and slow technological change, effective competition prevails if the conditions for actual or potential competition are met (Shepherd 1996, Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1982) . The conditions for efficiency are more complicated if technology is dynamic. Schumpeter (1942) pointed out that dynamic efficiency gains frequently can only be achieved at the sacrifice of static efficiency (see also von
Weizsäcker 1980). Competition is generally considered a more powerful mechanism than the specification of property rights (Vickers and Yarrow 1988, Newbery 1999 ).
Other things equal, its effect is to flatten managers' indifference curves in figure 3.
Regulation was traditionally conceptualized as enforcement of market-like discipline in situations where competition was not effective (e.g., Phillips 1993) . With the move to more open market environments, its role has been redefined to secure the preconditions for competition in industries where monopolistic and competitive market segments coexist (Laffont and Tirole, 2000) . Like monitoring by owners, public regulation has to overcome asymmetric information. Efficient regulation therefore needs to design a system of incentives that induces the desired behavior (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) . In figure 3 , effective regulation will shift the outcome toward a higher level of social output (i.e. to a lower profit/staff hill) and possibly toward a higher level of efficiency (i.e.
closer to the peak of the profit/staff hills).
For the purposes of this paper, the interplay of these component incentive mechanisms needs to be examined. This question has attracted growing interest and recent empirical studies of telecommunications deserve brief mentioning. 7 In a panel study of the effects of privatization and competition on network expansion and efficiency, Ros (1999) found that in high-income nations private ownership was correlated with significantly wider diffusion of telephone service, faster growth in the number of access lines per capita, and higher labor productivity. However, Ros did not find any influence of private ownership in countries with a gross domestic product per capita below US$10,000. Boylaud and
Nicoletti (2001) combined cluster analysis and panel data to examine telecommunications markets in the OECD. They found that privatization had weakly enhanced efficiency, but that competition had a more decisive influence. In a study of 31 privatized telecommunications firms in 25 countries, Bortolotti, D'Souza, Fantini and Megginson (2002) observed significant increases in post-privatization performance, and that a significant part of the gains was attributable to regulatory change and the introduction of competition. Wallsten (2001) found for a group of 30 African and South American nations that competition was the main source of efficiency improvements. Privatization alone yielded only limited benefits; however, privatization combined with regulation was positively correlated with better performance. Li and Xu (2002) detected that efficiency improvements were highest when privatization and competition were combined.
Gutierrez and Berg (2000), Levy and Spiller (1996) and Henisz (2002) emphasize the importance of regulatory commitment and a stable institutional framework for investment as preconditions for good performance. The general tenor emerging from these studies is that the configuration of property rights, competition and regulation is crucial. However, as most of these studies model ownership as a dichotomous dummy variable, they do not directly explore the effects of mixed ownership on performance.
From this brief review − abstracting for a moment from regulation − we would expect that mixed enterprise fall between the public and private cases. Compared to fully private enterprise, we would expect lower efficiency but higher levels of social output.
Compared to fully public enterprise, we would expect higher efficiency but no clear ranking with regard to social output. However, these potential advantages may be neutralized by inherent conflicts of interest once regulation is added. For example, the state as an owner may want to delay competition to increase the profitability of the firm or its market value prior to privatization. 8 As the regulated public and mixed firms originated from the monopolies of the past, management may attempt to get protection from competition, perhaps in exchange for social output promises. This is not fundamentally different from private firms seeking protection from a regulatory agency.
However, in the case of public and mixed firms, management may have more effective competitive and non-competitive industries, emphasizes the wide range of results, especially in monopolistic industries. See also Megginson and Netter (2001) .
access, as the government-owner is also the principal of the regulator. 9 This risk may be counterbalanced by the fact that national regulatory agencies (NRAs) are relatively new organizations subject to review by the courts and close scrutiny by the public. Under pressure to show tangible improvements, regulators may adopt a stringent and even vindictive attitude towards public and mixed firms. Given these concerns, the clearer incentive structure created by the regulation of private firms may, after all, constitute a superior arrangement to achieve efficiency and social output goals. An answer to these questions can only be given empirically and will be pursued in section five after a synopsis of the telecommunications reform process in Europe.
Privatization and regulatory reform in EU telecommunications
Since the 1980s, the European Commission, Council, Parliament, [ Figure 4 about here]
To safeguard liberalization, the EU mandated the separation of operation and regulation that had historically been vested in the state-owned PTOs. In 1990, only the U.K. had established an independent regulatory agency. As a precondition for the full liberalization of the telecommunications markets in 1998, all member states were required to set up regulators. These national regulatory authorities (NRAs) differ with respect to their degree of independence and therefore their susceptibility to pressure from government, an issue that will be examined in more detail below.
Empirical observations
Several approaches are possible to study the two questions posed in this paper, including case studies of the interaction of regulators and public firms, an examination of complaint 12 While ownership by foreign state-owned companies may raise concerns (see Sidak (2001) commenting on the takeover of the U.S. mobile carrier VoiceStream by T-Mobile, a subsidiary of German Telekom) it does not create conflicts of interest between the national government and the NRA.
records, or an investigation of regulatory and court decisions. However, as capture can happen tacitly or even unknowingly, it may be difficult to uncover with case-oriented methods. Moreover, complaints and court decisions could be seen as instances of working institutional safeguards, unless there is a systematic pattern in favor of the incumbent. To avoid these problems, we adopted an alternative, indirect route of reviewing actual conduct and performance indicators. Case information, complaint records and interviews were used in a supplementary way. 14 Empirical tests can be constructed in three ways: using time series data reflecting periods of public, mixed and private ownership (a "before-and-after approach"); cross-sectional data; or panel data.
As longitudinal data were only available for some of the variables, the paper relies on a cross-national design. Data for all fifteen incumbent European PTOs (one for each EU member state) were collected for the year 2000. The harmonization of the legal and regulatory framework in the EU reduces national diversity in relevant conditions, easing some of the challenges of cross-national research. Our observations can either be interpreted as reflecting the population of regulated incumbent PTOs in the EU or as a convenience sample of regulated PTOs. Reflecting these dual interpretations, the data was analyzed using descriptive and econometric methods.
To examine the interaction of regulation and public ownership, it was necessary to establish how an abuse would manifest itself. In a monopolistic environment, capture would likely result in prices above cost or forms of X-inefficiency. In a competitive 13 State ownership is less important in the fast growing mobile communications sector, where newly licensed private service providers in most countries captured more than half of the total market (Curwen 2002) .
framework, price increases are limited by actual and potential entry, but incumbents can benefit from regulator-sanctioned entry barriers. Therefore, we collected information on interconnection prices, which are a critical variable affecting entry opportunities.
Interconnection allows new entrants to link their networks with existing service providers, thus overcoming the disadvantages created by network externalities, economies of scale, and reputation effects (Brock and Katz 1997) . In addition, we reviewed the number of new competitors. Controlling for other factors, an observation that regulated public or mixed firms were allowed to charge higher interconnection rates than private regulated firms or were otherwise shielded from new entrants was interpreted as a distortion of regulation in their favor. Searching for answers to the second question, indicators of government influence on management decisions in pursuit of social output goals had to be identified. Historically, such intervention typically resulted in demands to maintain or expand employment and to provide universal service by using some form of internal subsidy. It could also become visible in demands to keep prices low and offer unified prices across the entire service territory. Either observation was interpreted as a sign of continued government influence in favor of social output goals.
[ Table 1 about here] Tables 1 and 2 summarize descriptive statistics by ownership form. PTOs were classified as "public" if the state held x ≥ 75% of the shares; as "mixed" if the public share was 25% ≤ x < 75%; and as "private" if x < 25%. 15 These thresholds were used as they correspond to business law, which typically empowers owners of more than 25% of the stock with veto rights, giving them considerable clout over management decisions. 16 Populationweighted averages were calculated to correct for varying country size. In addition, the range of observations was determined.
Prices for three types of interconnection − double transit, dingle transit, and local termination, all at peak − were distinguished. Double transit interconnection allows access to all customers on an incumbent's national network. Single transit interconnection allows access to all customers in a metropolitan area. Local termination grants access at a point close to the customer (e.g. a local exchange) (CEC 2001) . For this reason, double transit usually incurs the highest and local termination the lowest charge.
We found that interconnection price levels were lowest for privately owned and highest for publicly owned PTOs. With the exception of single transit, interconnection charges of mixed PTOs fell in between these two cases. The levels of all interconnection prices of public PTOs exceeded the benchmarks established by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC 2000) . 17 In the case of mixed PTOs, local termination charges were within the EU limits but single and double transit prices exceeded them. However, the margin by which double transit charges exceeded the benchmark was lower than that of regulated public PTOs. The interconnection prices of privately owned PTOs for local 15 Only the PTOs of Austria and Luxembourg fell into the "public" category, together representing only 2% of the EU's fixed access lines. Austria is nearly twenty times as populous as Luxembourg and thus dominates the observations. 16 Strategic investors may be given managing power even though they only hold a minority of the shares. However, this issue was not relevant in our cases.
termination and single transit were within the EU limits; however, the charges for double transit exceeded the upper bound by 6.7%.
Whereas these differences can be seen as signs of a strategic use of interconnection charges, they do not represent unequivocal proof. argued that EU interconnection prices are so low that they have slowed down facilitiesbased entry (Cave and Prosperetti 2001) . Therefore, while public and mixed PTOs (and to a very limited degree private PTOs) may have been able to get temporary protection from competition, it comes at the cost of more intense facilities-based competition in the medium and long run. Thus, we cautiously interpret the findings as weak proof for a more favorable treatment of public and mixed PTOs. with a fully private and lowest in nations with a publicly owned operator. However, after correcting for the differing population sizes, nations with publicly owned operators 17 The ranges set by the European Commission are and 1.5-1.8 Euro cent for dual transit, 0.8-1.5 Euro cent for single transit, and 0.5-0.9 Euro cent per minute of local termination (CEC 2000) .
attracted a larger number of new entrants. New competitors were able to gain higher market shares in nations with fully private and mixed ownership of the incumbent PTO, as would be expected given the level of interconnection prices and the number of entrants. They were least successful in penetrating local or long distance markets in nations with a publicly owned operator.
[ 18 Of the fifteen incumbents, three can set their prices freely, nine operate under price caps and enjoy downward flexibility, and three need prior approval by the NRA for price changes (CEC 2002, Annex II, p. 5-6) . In Belgium, Greece, Spain and the Netherlands, there are recurrent complaints that incumbents use retail prices to exert price squeezes on new entrants (CEC 2002). Sappington and Sidak (2002) maintain that state-owned enterprise have a stronger incentive than private firms to choose prices below an acceptable cost standard. 19 Based on the determination of negligible universal service obligation costs, Germany chose not to develop a universal service plan at all. The coincidence of higher interconnection rates and unfunded
To examine the relations between government and regulatory agencies, we constructed a measure of the degree of regulatory independence from an OECD (2000) report. Using a dichotomous coding scheme, regulatory agencies were evaluated based on eight criteria:
the independence from the executive branch, the procedure for appointing regulators, financing sources, the ability of the government to overrule regulatory decisions, reporting duties, and three tasks of the agency. Each national regulatory agency received one point if the degree of independence was high and a zero if it was low. NRAs could therefore receive a low score of zero and a high score of eight in case of a highly independent setup. We hypothesized that the risk of capture by managers of publicly owned firms (or their public owner) would be higher, the less independent an agency.
Interestingly, regulatory agencies in nations with publicly owned PTOs enjoyed a slightly higher degree of independence than in nations with fully private PTOs. The score was lowest in nations with mixed PTOs. Although the differences were small, this might indicate that in efforts to maintain a non-partisan reputation of regulatory agencies, a higher degree of independence was chosen in countries pursuing slower privatization.
The low score in the case of regulated mixed firms may reflect attempts of the government to secure continued control through ownership and regulation channels. 
Econometric analysis
universal service obligations could point to a form of cross subsidization. However, note the caveat regarding interconnection charges above. 20 We were not able to measure differences in enforcement that may exist among EU NRAs. The annual reports of the European Commission (CEC 2000 (CEC , 2001 (CEC , 2002 reflect concerns about such variations.
A descriptive analysis of the empirical data provides first insights, but it does not unveil multivariate patterns. An econometric analysis was constrained by the small number of observations and possible endogeneity issues, although both were mitigated by the EU context. As PTOs typically were reorganized prior to privatization to increase the potential sales revenues, endogeneity was less of an issue for our data set. 21 All models were estimated using an ordinary least squares (OLS) method.
We presumed that preferential treatment of public and mixed PTOs would be visible in a significant influence of the ownership form (public, mixed, and private) on selected conduct and performance variables after controlling for other independent factors. 22 The null hypothesis therefore was that ownership form does not affect the regulatory treatment of PTOs. For this purpose, the following general empirical model was specified:
in which DV i represents the dependent variables of interest in this paper (i = interconnection prices, retail price level, and teledensity) and ownership form, competition, income, and so forth are independent variables. Empirical models were specified based on theoretical relations (variable definitions and sources are presented in table 5 ). To find the most parsimonious models, stepwise regression was used. The variables listed in tables 3 and 4 identify all included variables; parameter estimates were only entered for independent variables whose contribution to the explanatory power exceeded a certain threshold.
[ Table 3 about here]
Tables 3 and 4 present findings that were acceptable from both theoretical and statistical viewpoints. 23 EU member states are obligated to set interconnection prices that reflect the cost of service provision. Other things equal, interconnection charges were therefore expected to be lower in countries with a more efficient network and competition in local markets. To test whether ownership had a significant relation to interconnection charges after these factors were taken into account, a number of regression models were specified (table 3) . Double transit charges, which are widely used in the EU, could not be explained well by any of the models and ownership did not appear as a significant variable.
Ownership, if specified as a continuous variable, had a measurable and significant effect on single transit and local termination charges after other independent variables were controlled. Model 5 used the teledensity for fixed service as a proxy for the efficiency of the existing network. Model 6 used labor productivity (as a proxy for the efficiency of the network) and a competition variable. In these models, the ownership variable was 22 It is important to keep in mind that the goal of this paper is not to test whether public or private PTOs are more efficient but whether ownership form has an effect on selected conduct and performance statistics that reflect the relations between a PTO and its regulators.
significant. Models 7-9 tackle the factors influencing local termination charges. Again, the effect of ownership was significant. Separate dummy variables to reflect public, mixed, and private ownership, either alone or jointly with other explanatory variables,
were not significant in any of the models. Likewise, the regulatory independence index did not yield significant increases in explanatory power. Two alternative measures of competition (market share of new entrants (COMP) and competitors per population (COPP)) were introduced in models 3, 6, 8, and 9. With the exception of the model for double transit, parameters were significant and had the expected negative sign. None of the models could detect a significant influence of the interaction between ownership and regulation on the observed interconnection charges.
[ Table 4 about here]
In addition to interconnection prices, we also analyzed whether ownership form had an effect on three performance measures, the prices for residential and business voice services as well as teledensity. Based on the conceptual arguments discussed above, we expected that competition would be the dominant factor with regard to prices and that ownership would not matter. Surprisingly, both ownership and competition had a significant influence on the prices for voice service. Private ownership coincided with a higher level of prices; competition -as expected -exerted a negative influence on prices.
The best explanatory power was achieved when adding a measure for labor productivity.
Teledensity was highly correlated with the GDP/capita, but the ownership variable did 23 If the observations were interpreted as the population of EU PTOs, all that would matter is the parameter estimates. To allow interpretation as a sample of a larger population, standard significance tests were not have a significant effect. If specified as zero-one dummy variables, public, mixed, and private ownership did not add explanatory power. Like in the case of interconnection, measures for the degree of independence of the regulatory agency and interactions with the ownership structure did not yield significant parameter estimates.
[ Table 5 about here]
Apart from the sign and the significance of coefficients, it is also necessary to review whether they are meaningful. As the estimates are not based on a log-linear model,
parameters cannot be directly interpreted as elasticities. The parameters in models [4] [5] [6] indicate that in our data a 10% increase in private ownership was associated with a decrease in the single transit charge of 0.048-0.067 Euro cents. Models 7-9 indicate that the same change in the ownership structure corresponded with a 0.044-0.049 Euro cent reduction in local termination charges. A 10% increase in private ownership was accompanied by a US$ 8.13 increase in the cost of the annual residential service basket and a US$ 21.69 increase in the cost of the business basket. These estimates are in an acceptable range. The models for interconnection charges explained 29-43% of the variance whereas the models for prices and teledensity explained at around 50%.
Overall, these econometric results corroborated the picture emerging from the descriptive analysis of the data. With regard to ownership, all but two of the patterns described in section 5 remained visible after other independent variables were taken into account.
Only in the models for double transit interconnection prices and teledensity did performed and reported in tables 3 and 4.
ownership not have detectable effects and we could not reject the null hypothesis.
However, these effects could only be found when ownership was specified as a continuous variable. No direct evidence of the organization of regulatory agencies or of interaction terms could be found.
Conclusions
This paper analyzed the phenomenon of regulated public and mixed firms through conceptual and empirical lenses. The coexistence of regulation and state ownership emerged from a mismatch in the timing of liberalization and privatization and is now widespread outside the U.S. Two aspects of the new phenomenon were explored.
Firstly, we examined potential conflicts of interest between the state as a regulator and owner. Secondly, we explored whether the combination of public ownership and regulation reduced shortcomings of the regulation of private firms. To tackle these questions empirically, data for the incumbent telecommunications operators of the fifteen EU member states were analyzed.
With regard to the first question, both comparative statistics and econometric analysis revealed that interconnection prices by regulated public and mixed PTOs are above those of privately owned PTOs. The interconnection prices of public firms exceeded the EU benchmarks more often and by a higher margin than those of mixed and private firms. In the case of double transit interconnection, which is widely used in Europe, we found higher prices for regulated public and mixed firms only in descriptive statistics but none of the multivariate models could explain their variance well. Adjusted for population, the number of newly licensed competitors was highest in countries with a publicly owned PTO and lowest in countries with a mixed PTO. The market shares of new competitors in countries with mixed and private PTOs were very similar but they were lower where the incumbent was a regulated public PTO.
With regard to the second question, we found that retail prices were lowest for mixed PTOs and highest for privately owned PTOs. Profitability was lowest for public and highest for private PTOs. With regard to a simple partial productivity measure, public
PTOs scored better than private and mixed PTOs. Countries with a mixed PTO had the highest teledensity and countries with a public PTO the lowest. However, this result was strongly influenced by the income level of a nation and the econometric analysis showed no significant effect of the ownership form. Regulated public and mixed firms were more often than their private counterparts asked to finance universal service obligations without explicit compensation. However, compared to overall revenues the net costs of these services were considered low by policy-makers. Lastly, although the differences were small, we found that an index of regulatory independence was highest in countries with a publicly owned and lowest in the case of mixed PTOs. Econometric analysis did not reveal any significant influence of this index on any of the independent variables.
Neither did we find an effect of the interaction of ownership and regulation. In line with the expectations from the conceptual discussion, we found that mixed PTOs outperformed public PTOs with respect to key performance indicators such as prices, profitability and teledensity. Interestingly, mixed PTOs offered their services at lower prices than private PTOs.
These findings amount to a mixed picture. On the one hand, we found hints that regulated public and mixed PTOs derived advantages from the dual roles of the government as owner and regulator, especially with regard to interconnection and downward pricing flexibility. However, there is considerable theoretical disagreement about the correct level of interconnection charges and so far no successful challenge has been mounted. On the other hand, we found counteracting forces and even potential disadvantages. No indication could be found that PTOs were shielded from new entrants.
The low labor productivity in mixed firms may reflect informal constraints on streamlining the workforce. There also was weak evidence that regulated public and mixed PTOs were utilized to pursue universal service goals without explicit compensation, although most countries had plans to move to such a scheme. The empirical observations point to potential tensions between government regulation and ownership, but not a systematic pattern of abuse. This relative "ownership neutrality" of regulation is probably rooted in the mature legal and institutional framework in the EU, with its high degree of regulatory pragmatism and enforcement by a stable court system.
In line with the findings of other studies, competition was found to be an important aspect of the institutional matrix with respect to prices and teledensity. In an open market framework, only limited room is left to utilize public ownership to pursue policy goals.
Rather, regulation becomes the main incentive mechanism to foster social output.
Therefore, the ability to use government ownership to overcome some of the limits of regulation is probably limited to monopolistic market segments where public policy retains more degrees of freedom. In principle, and under ideal conditions, public ownership could be used to pursue public policy goals without harming competition, but in the EU this is an unlikely choice given the diminished trust in the ability of government to steer industries. Thus, while we found no compelling reason for accelerated privatization from a competitive point of view, we also found little evidence that further privatization would jeopardize vital public policy goals. However, it would likely reduce the appearance of inappropriateness of the dual role of the state as owner and regulator.
The empirical observations in this paper represent the universe of regulated incumbent Inspired by Eckel and Vining (1985) . 
